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1. Introduction1 
The US financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the EU recession hit the European banking system 
gravely. Moreover, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) banking market showed a variety 
of individual hazardous impacts from national policies, foreign exchange rates, and solvency. 
Besides, the crises caused stricter regulation and controlling in the banking sector: first of all, 
the increasing capital adequacy and solvency limits of Basel III. 
Although, in the second decade of the 21st century, the CEE commercial banking sector has 
been operating in market economies as usual, the region has a legacy of the command 
economy that lasted until 1989. Benczes (2008) summarized this impact of past on a banking 
sector which got liberalized and privatized a few decades ago and which was shifted towards 
a two-tier system and opened to foreign investors, who have played the role of majority owner 
in an undercapitalized transition region. Besides, CEE markets are characterized by small 
scale, low financial penetration, and low degree of product diversification. This process 
generated individual characteristics for the vulnerability and stability of the CEE banking 
sector. (Benczes 2008: 128-138) According to Jokipii and Lucey (2002), by the 2000s, the 
CEE banking sectors were over the privatization, deregulation, liberalization of licensing, and 
capitalization by foreign investors. The 1990s already saw market clearing by bank failures, 
especially in the case of under-capitalized, domestic small banks. 
The regional and historical characteristics led to a relatively dynamic expansion of crediting 
from a low level of activity. This credit growth was accelerated by the economic catching-up 
of the region. (Kiss et al. 2006) The favourable global economic and financial circumstances 
and the medium-term growth of the CEE region led to risky exposure by the lending activity 
measurable in credit/deposit ratio. As Benczes (2008:135) worded, the CEE banking sector 
had to face challenges to “find the appropriate balance between an increased lending activity 
and to maintain a stable functioning”. 
Small scale, fragmented market structure is typical in CEE not only because of the fragmented 
country structure of the region, but also because of the various national financial-fiscal-
monetary policy mixes and strategies. Sovereign risks and interest rate policies affected the 
structure of loans and deposits differently. Before the global and euro zone crisis, all CEE 
countries had national monetary autonomy. Some of them chose the strategy to pass it on to 
the European Central Bank as soon as possible (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia), or have 
been planning to do it soon (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania). Some others have strived – at 
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least since 2010 – to reserve the national currency (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary). 
Some monetary authorities applied strict and high interest rates, some did not; some countries 
had higher foreign reserves, others had lower in the eve of the crisis, etc. These differences in 
policy modified and differentiated the credit and deposit structure of the countries. Due to the 
differences of national risk premium and interest rate policies, in those countries (Hungary, 
Baltics, Romania, Ukraine) which kept high rates beside giving opportunity for foreign 
currency loans, the depreciation of emerging market currencies by a global panic found their 
households and firms deeply indebted in euro, Swiss francs and some other foreign 
currencies. Those countries which kept their risk premium close or under the euro zone in 
market rates experienced insignificant exchange rate exposure in their loans. Thus, it was 
expected, that the financial contagion was not uniform in the region. 
The purpose of the study is to analyse the balance sheet and cash-flow impacts of various 
exchange rate risks in CEE banking systems. The availability of data determined the countries 
involved into the regression analysis. The following countries are included into the regression: 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia. In some citations we can find more 
countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, FYROM (Macedonia), Belarus, Albania, but 
these countries are not subjects of this analysis. 
The hypothesis is that the difference of foreign exchange regimes and policies resulted in 
different contagion intensity in the CEE countries. The assumption is that the change of FX 
rate determines the ratio of non-performing loans in the CEE countries in different degrees, 
depending on the exchange rate regime and share of foreign loans during the global financial 
and economic crisis. Therefore, the FX asset crisis of banks depended on the volatility of 
foreign exchange, namely, the volume of the currency crisis induced by the global and 
European financial and output processes. 
This study will give an overview on the relationship between banking contagion and foreign 
exchange risk and its relevance in CEE, and then makes or cites correlation calculations on 
exchange rate impacts. The methodology is, first, to introduce the banking path that led to the 
specific state of CEE countries after the global crisis of 2008. Then linear regression is 
calculated to examine the hypothesis in relation to FX and non-performing loans. 
The CEE political decision-makers have treated the exchange rate primarily as a tool for 
competitiveness and economic growth. This strengthened the importance of short-term 
effects. The motivation of seeking correlation between exchange rate policy and financial 
contagion is to find the impact differences of various policies. 
2. The theory and methodology of financial contagion 
The idea of the hypothesis originates in Darvas and Szapáry (1999) who analysed the 
financial contagion in the capital markets under different exchange rate regimes.  The authors 
analysed the appropriate exchange rate regimes to defend the national capital markets from 
international financial crisis. For this purpose their study surveyed CEE and Israeli regimes 
from aspect of nominal and real exchange rates, interest rates, risk spreads, variability of 
interest rates and the reaction of stock and bond markets for the previous variables. This paper 
is focusing on banking financing. Caramazza et al. (2004) examine the financial linkages 
through creditors in currency crises. Their study establishes that currency crises have trade 
and financial implications. This means that there is a shift in the investors’ sentiment about 
risk perception, and that is why they rebalance their portfolio internationally. To reduce their 
exposure in assets with increasing risk, investors withdraw their money from deposits and 
securities of certain regions. Because of information asymmetry, securities will be liquidated 
not only in the region in crisis but in other ones with similar risk and vulnerability profile, too, 
without fundamental reasons. (Obstfeld (1994) calls it “second generation crisis”.) The 
conditions of a currency crisis are defined by Camarazza et al. (2004) so that there is a 
significant depreciation of foreign exchange after robust appreciation of REER, and decrease 
in foreign reserves. 
From our perspective, the banking contagion under different CEE monetary policies will be in 
the focus of this analysis. The financial contagion can be understood very broadly on any 
financial markets and systems. We are interested in a narrower meaning related to banking 
contagion only. Several definitions exist to describe the different aspects of financial 
contagion. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explained it as a coordination failure between 
deposits and their use. Besides, their approach is that bank runs are not accidental but self-
fulfilling risks. In their early model, the vulnerability of banks was connected to the conflict 
between the withdrawal of deposits and the investments into illiquid (long term) assets.  
Battacharya et a. (1998) worded it as bank runs triggered by adverse information. Allan and 
Gale (1998) concentrated on the strong correlation between business cycles and bank runs by 
claiming financial crises as “inherent” parts of the business cycle. Bandt and Hartman (2001) 
joined to the coordination failure explanation by defining the banking contagion as a systemic 
failure of fundamentally solvent institutions. This systemic risk is manifested by co-
movements, cross-market events and interdependences. (Forbes –Rigobon 2002). 
For example, Manz (2002) or Schoenmaker (1998) distinguished two origins of contagion: 
one is the case when the debtors’ failure results in the creditors’ failure, namely the contagion 
occurs through capital connections. The other case is called information contagion when the 
collapse of a bank or asset induces liquidation in mass, namely depositors and investors 
rescue their money from similar banks and assets. (The latter has significant literature – Chen 
(1999), Acharya and Youlmazer (2003), Ahrony and Swary (1983) – but this scenario has not 
been typical of the CEE banking sector under the period of global crisis started in 2008.) 
The contagion from capital linkages (or credit channel) is described by Schoenmaker as a 
‘complex web’ of interbank connections. The exposure always depends on the size of the 
borrowing bank and not of the lending one. And since 2008, the market must recognize that 
even borrowers of a “too big to fail” size are not riskless either. 
Kollman (2010) interprets the contagion concept as a mismatch between liquidity of bank 
assets and liabilities, which creates fragility in the banking system, thus multiplying the 
individual crisis impacts. Short deposits and long term loans are in contradiction in sense of 
liquidity. In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the stochastic, excessive withdrawal 
of deposits causes costly liquidation of bank assets, and maybe a default, too. Especially in a 
globalized financial market, banks hold international assets and liabilities, which create a 
geographical channel for contagion by global credit crunch. This is a typical cash-flow 
contagion approach, which derives the crisis from friction of maturity. Such a bank run is 
caused by a change of expectations when consumption appetite increases while saving 
propensity is shrinking in parallel. The cash-flow contagion model was developed by Chari 
and Jagannathan (1988) and Gorton (1985) by introducing the asymmetric information and 
this way the risk of long term assets, namely, the depositors are not informed about the use of 
their deposits. This factor makes it possible to analyse bank runs induced by panic when the 
depositors see en masse withdrawals but do not know whether it happens because of 
increasing consumption or non-performing loans. 
We can observe crisis from the aspect of default as well. The question of balance sheet 
contagion approach is the following: How can financial contagion appear and spread in a 
bank’s assets? A general balance sheet of banks can be helpful. Among the assets, we can find 
‘cash’, ‘interbank loans’, ‘credit to non-bank partners’, ‘equity holding’, as well as 
‘equipment and premises’. In the liabilities, there are ‘equity’, ‘interbank deposits’, 
‘retail/wholesale deposits’, and ‘subordinated debt’. Obviously, the spread of non-performing 
interbank debits and credits and the non-performing non-financial partners’ loan can cause 
capital linkage-related contagion. Besides, the depreciation of cross-holding financial equity 
can cause contagion through a financial market channel. Cross-holdings redistribute the 
liquidity in liquid times with plenty of credit money supply, but in the case of liquidity 
shortage, withdrawals from deposits exceed short-term assets, that is why long term asset 
liquidation becomes necessary. This leads to the depreciation of claims. 
Allen and Gale (2000:4) explain that the interbank market and retail banking operate by very 
different mechanisms. The mismatches in retail banking enforce the bank to liquidate long 
term assets to be solvent toward short term depositors. The interbank failure occurs when a 
commercial bank cannot get any liquidity from other banks if its credit demand is in excess. 
The excess demand appears, first, in a region, but can quickly spread to the neighbouring 
ones, which ultimately causes need for liquidation and thus the depreciation of long term 
assets. Namely, the infected regions experience a decreasing value of their claims, which 
reduces the solvency and lending capacity of banks.  
Allen and Gale (2000) constructed a ‘liquidity preference’ model which can analyse small 
shocks causing large contagion effects in the banking sector. The main risk in their 
understanding is rooted in the alternative of banks that they can choose for what term to lend 
their current deposits: short or long. Based on the previous theory of business cycle-related 
financial crisis (Allen – Gale 1998), this model seeks real correlation and linkages between 
regions under financial contagion. In the model, liquidity preference is stochastic, which 
motivates risk sharing. The liquidity preference model is able to treat variously integrated 
financial markets from the aspect of a complete market structure, where every entity has 
impact on every other, up to the incomplete and disconnected market structures where the 
regions are particularly disintegrated or isolated. The banking crisis is understood as an excess 
demand for liquidity of the sum of the regions. They found evidence that an incomplete 
banking market structure with unilateral exposure among banks can show contagion. 
 When it comes to financial contagion, actually it models the probability of spread of crisis. 
(Lagunoff – Schreft 1998) Rochet and Tirole (1996) applied this approach to bank runs, 
namely, they surveyed the probability of the system collapse from the fall of one bank. 
Besides, Kiyotaki and Moore (1998) followed how the liquidity shortage goes through the 
credit chain.    
Can banks do individually anything against financial contagion? Ex ante, prudent lending and 
low credit/deposit ratio used to be preventive, but sooner or later every bank got tempted to 
achieve high profit from a booming period of loans and asset prices – just like in the Minsky-
cycle of financial crisis (Minsky 1982 and 1992). As Losoncz (2009) summarized, since the 
practice of the financial sector led to the crisis of 2007-2009, it seems that the preventive 
approach is very limited. Ex post, reaction to crisis means adjustment to the changed deposit 
withdrawal habit or to the increasing likelihood of default. Banks can try to reduce the volume 
of claims with a more limited lending, decrease the credit/deposit ratio by collecting deposit 
and stopping crediting, clean their balance sheet from defaulted credit, cut the costs of 
operation, turn away from lending toward other banking activities, etc. (Losoncz and Nagy, 
2010). After the occurrence of a crisis, surviving banks have a very narrow and path-
dependent room for manoeuvre for a longer period.  
The measurement of contagion can mean various models. There are models for probability, 
effect, etc. Corsetti et al. (2001) criticized the contagion models and called attention to the 
empirical volatility of correlation and covariance between regional financial markets. For 
example, Schoenmaker (1998) used a regression model based on Lancaster (1990) and 
Heffernan (1995).  
Jokipii and Lucey (2007) measured the contagion in CEE banking sector as a co-movement of 
national markets with a two sample t-test, regression analysis and granger causality test. Their 
correlation coefficients indicate the persistence of banking contagion between the CEE 
countries –Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic only. This analysis showed strong 
correlation in case of contagion effect from the Czech Republic to Hungary and not in any 
other direction. This result was earlier recognized by Morzuch and Weller (1999) who 
strengthened the interesting fact, that a national financial crisis in 1990s did not really affect 
the neighbouring CEE countries, namely regional bank runs did not cause cross-border 
contagion, even after liberalization. They also tried to find its reasons. Their model assumes 
that bank runs are launched by second generation crises, namely speculation. Speculation is 
based on a continuous appreciation of financial assets from quick profit targeting capital 
inflow into the financial markets of an emerging market after financial liberalization. 
However, the undercapitalized CEE region quickly found big, effective, prudent and well 
capitalized multinational banks with lower risk exposure. Besides, small local banks typically 
have no international connections. This is known from Gropp et al. (2009), who examined the 
European banking sector, and they found evidence for cross-border banking contagion only in 
the case of large banks because the cross-border exposure of small banks is insignificant. 
Their methodology was to collect stock price and debt of banks excluding the small ones 
trading under 1000 shares in more than 30% of trading days. The purpose was to measure the 
distance to default, which is defined as follows: “[...] the difference between the current 
market value of the assets of a firm and its estimated default point, divided by the volatility of 
assets”. “The value of equity is modelled as a call option on the assets of the company. The 
level and the volatility of the assets are calculated with the Black/Scholes model using the 
observed market value and volatility of equity and the balance-sheet data on debt.” 
Árvai et al. (2009) concentrated on the cross-border interbank spill-over between Western and 
Eastern Europe. They highlight the significance of ownership, namely the importance of the 
foreign parents of CEE banks. It can be expected that foreign ownership has softened the 
financial contagion in CEE commercial banks as parent banks capitalized their affiliates, and 
turned into red in household and corporate crediting. This way there has been a really strong 
cross-market rebalancing in the region. They recognized an asymmetric dependency of CEE 
countries on the Western European banks, which also strengthens our assumption that 
banking contagion is very much determined (softened) by multinational foreign banks. The 
measured exposure of Western banks (except Austrian and Swedish ones) is small. The 
contagion effect is more likely if the lender is concentrating on the CEE region. The authors 
proved that CEE bank crediting is very much affected by extra regional banks because these 
countries are heavily exposed to Western European banks. 
Morzuch and Weller (1999:5-6) found that, besides the presence of multinational banks in 
CEE region, the following lowered the contagion risk in the 1990s. This is a very instructive 
list as many of them were not true in the 2000s: 
- High risk premium threatened from local borrowing. This did not remain true for the 2000s, 
since in some countries market rates became low; other countries circumvented the high 
national rates with authorization of foreign-currency credit.  
- Foreign exchange appreciation, which has been very typical in other emerging countries – 
mostly because of the exchange rate peg –, did not happen in CEE countries, so the financial 
assets did not become overvalued. This characteristic was neither completely true for CEE in 
the 2000s as some countries used pegging (Baltics, Bulgaria), or the interest rate policy 
strengthened the national currency unduly (Hungary, Romania). 
- Default risk was law because of the economic prosperity. Before 2008 it was particularly 
true but default risk was lower due to the high liquidity of global markets. 
- Maturity risk from high share of short term loans, which can result in a quick wave of 
defaults, was not significant because of cautious high stocks of official foreign reserves. This 
was neither true in the 2000s. It was indicated by the general 20-30 percent depreciation of 
CEE national currencies fundamentally in every CEE country (except the Baltic countries and 
Bulgaria pegging strictly) that in terms of their foreign reserves, CEE national banks were 
unprepared in their foreign reserves to the sudden illiquidity in the end of 2008. 
Klein (2013) analysed the impact of macroeconomic variables on credit default. This survey 
was based on a dynamic panel regression distinguishing bank-level (equity-to-assets, ROE, 
Loans-to-assets, change of loans), country specific (unemployment, inflation, exchange rate) 
and global variables (euro zone GDP growth, volatility of S&P 500 as a risk aversion 
indicator). 
The following methodology is built on linear regression analysis with SPSS. The predicting 
variable is the extent of change of FX rate. The dependent variable is the ratio of non-
performing loans. Attention is focused on the betas as indicators of strength of relation and 
the r2 as a scale of significance. 
As it was mentioned above, there are several studies that use regression analysis on a broad 
range of macroeconomic or banking level factors of contagion. Regressions are calculated to 
examine the hypothesis, namely, the change of FX rate determines the ratio of non-
performing loans in the CEE countries in different degree depending on exchange rate regime 
and share of foreign loans during the global financial and economic crisis.  
It is clear that the credit default is determined not only by the FX rate (see the models of 
Schoenmaker (1998) or Klein (2013)). For example, the following multinominal regression 
including FX rate impact, GDP growth and nominal interest rate can be an appropriate 
function:  
 NPL = β0 + β1  FXDIFi + β2  ii + β3 ∆GDPi + εi  ,    (1)  
where NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, ∆GDPi is the change of 
quarterly GDP, ii is the quarterly three-month market rate, and FXDIF is the ratio of the 
quarterly average exchange rate difference from average exchange rate of 2nd quarter of 2008 
(right before the crisis), in euro to national currency:  
FXDIFi = (FXi – FXQ2,2008 ) /  FXQ2,2008 .     (2) 
The complex analysis of CEE countries already have been made by Klein (2013) as referred 
to above. Our focus is on FX impact because Klein’s model ignored the importance of foreign 
currency credit ratio and the exchange rate regime on spot rate. (See explanation later.) We 
seek a relationhip between nominal FX depreciation shocks and the credit default contagion. 
Nominal FX is reasonable as external loan financing is sensitive on spot rate and not on 
REER or NEER.  
The function for this regression is the following: 
NPL = β0 + β1  FXDIFi + εi ,      (3) 
Of course, the FX exposure resulting in a credit default can be the simplest to channel by the 
foreign currency loans into the banking system. This cannot be ignored. To preserve the 
transparency of the analysis, it is preferable to create clusters in the dimensions of change of 
FX rates, change of non-performing loans rates, and share of foreign loans form the total 
assets before doing the regression analysis. The change of FX rate will be established as 
follows: substitute in equation (2) is i = (2009Q2, 2010Q2, 2011Q2, 2012Q2) country-by-
country. Change of non-performing loans ratio means what the difference was in the end of 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 in comparison to the end of 2007. The share of foreign loans 
from the total assets will be paired year-by-year. 
The countries in the survey are the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), 
Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Romania (RO), Bulgaria (BG), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LI), Croatia (HR), Ukraine (UKR), Russia (RU) and Serbia (RS). 
 
3. Contagion in the CEE 
3.1. The pre-crisis structure of CEE from the aspect of contagion 
First of all, to understand the various contagion effects of the global crisis, we have to know 
the pre-crisis characteristics of the CEE banking sector. Árvai et al. (2009) found significant 
inter-linkages within Europe. The CEE banking sector depends on the Western European 
banks very much. In the CEE banking market, financial risk exposure is concentrated to 
Austrian, German and Italian banks, and in case of Baltics, to Swedish ones. As it is clear 
from Fig. 1, the post-Communist transitionary past of CEE and SEE regions resulted in 
aggressive banking strategies and a fast extension of credits. From the calculation of Árvai et 
al. (2009:7) it can be established that the speed of credit extension was 43% in the Baltics and 
15.5% in the V4 countries before the crisis (from 2004 to 2007) as a cumulated change, in the 
transition and integration period. Árvai et al. (2009) observed an inverse relationship between 
the degree of development and credit growth. However, it is more important to recognize 
generally about CEE countries that the extension of credits were significantly faster than the 
growth of deposits (see Fig. 1). This finally created a credit/deposit ratio, where the credits 
significantly exceeded the deposits, which resulted in an interbank contagion risk, too. 
The general tendency of CEE – according to Raiffeisen (2013) – is that loans significantly 
exceeded deposits before the crisis, which was followed by a correction forced by the global 
markets. From this ratio it could be foreseen which countries had to face with serious balance-
sheet contagion risk from uncovered credit defaults. This risk was multiplied by the exchange 
rate factor in case of Ukraine, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Belarus, and Serbia. Besides, those 
countries faced the crisis with a less fragile banking sector with a loan/deposit ratio under 100 
percent. 
 
 
 Fig. 1. Funding of credit expansion from 2003 to 2007 
 
Source: Árvai et al. (2009: Fig. 4.) 
3.2. Credit contagion 
Klein (2013) sought the reasons of non-performing loans in CEE and SEE regions. As it is 
clear from his regression analysis, there is a not too strong but significant negative correlation 
between GDP growth and the increase of credit defaults. He specifically found that recession 
is a factor of contagion. His paper tried to find a connection between credit default and other 
macroeconomic indicators as well but these significances are questionable, or many of them 
are not significant even at 10%. 
However, Klein (2013) found evidence that the solvency of CEE debtors is a little bit 
sensitive for the recession of the euro zone. He concluded that, in case of “the bank-level 
indicators, the estimations show that higher equity-to-assets ratio leads to lower NPLs, 
therefore confirming the “moral hazard” effect; and higher profitability (RoE) contributes to 
lower NPLs and suggests that better managed banks have, on average, better quality of 
assets. […] Unlike in other studies mentioned earlier, other bank-level indicators such as the 
bank size and expense-to-income ratio were not found to have significant impact. On the 
macroeconomic level, the results show that an increase in unemployment contribute to higher 
NPLs, thus validating the strong link between the business cycles and the banking sector’s 
resilience. In addition, both higher inflation and the depreciation of currency were found to 
increase NPLs.” Concerning global environment factors: „Higher volatility index and lower 
Euro area growth reduce the firms’ capacity to repay, perhaps because of higher rates in the 
international financial markets, which reduce the firms’ ability to rollover their debt, and 
because of lower export revenues. In addition, these two factors may also lead to lower 
external funding of the banks and therefore may result in negative credit growth […].” (Klein 
2013:12) 
In the case of FX rate effects, Klein (2013) could find a very week correlation with credit 
default, and in the case of some of the methods applied by him, it had no significance. (More 
general methods of moment were applied.) This calculation ignored tow facts: firstly, some 
countries in the region have used fixed FX rates. Fixed or almost fixed nominal spot rate 
cannot have room to measure effects. (We have to note that FX rate impact can be measured 
not only by nominal spot rate but by any real effective exchange rate as well. However, 
REER-based calculation cannot focus merely on FX spot rate nominal effects, which matters 
for the debtors’ solvency.) Secondly, the share of loans based on foreign currency and foreign 
borrowing has importance in the volume of FX rate impact. For example, the sharp credit 
growth in Baltic countries was absolutely financed from foreign credit in euro, thus the net 
foreign liabilities to the private sector credit climbed up to 35-55% in 2008. Meanwhile, in the 
Czech Republic, this ratio remained negative, namely there was internal financing. Most of 
the CEE countries had this ratio in the range of 5 to 25%. (IFS data from Árvai et al. 
(2009:10-11).) That is why, in our analysis, we run a regression only on those countries and 
periods which have no fixed FX rate and no membership in the single currency zone. Besides 
we create clusters of countries according to domestic and foreign financing ratios.  
Fig. 2 shows the difference of countries indebted mostly in foreign or local currency. 
Although private loan to GDP ratio is comparable between Slovakia and Hungary, or between 
Poland and Romania, but the multiplication of non-performing loans is significantly faster as 
a result of the crisis in the case of Hungary and Romania, which were financed from foreign 
loans. 
The FX rate depreciation hit mostly Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine with a 
depreciation of 20 to 30%. If we compare this with the ratio of foreign currency credit and 
external financing, it will be clear that these two factors strongly determined the banking 
contagion based on credit default risk. Besides, if we consider the pre-crisis HUF, RON, 
UAH, HRK highly overvalued by high market rates in comparison to euro rates, it can be 
understood how the foreign currency loans could become toxic assets in these countries, while 
the rest of CEE was affected “only” by the other factors of credit default (global recession, 
national recession, unemployment). From market interest rates (Fig. 3) it is clear that before 
the crisis, Romania, Croatia, and Hungary had to compensate fundamental risks with high 
national market rates. Thus, it was clear that local actors turned to FX credits with 
significantly lower market rates. In the case of ROE and ROA analyses (Raiffeisen 2013), it is 
harder to connect the damage of banks to the FX rate impact. It is more likely that 
discretionary effects, such as banking tax, or national recession factors determined the 
earnings much strongly.              
Fig. 2. Growth of loans-to-GDP ratio (2004-2008) and of non-performing loans (2008-2011) 
 
Source: Deloitte (2012) calculation from IMF and national bank data 
Fig.3. 3-months monthly market interest rates 2005-2013 
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Source: Eurostat 
Fig. 4. Share of Non-performing loans and foreign currency loans from total loans, 2007-11 
 
Source: author’s composition from Raiffeisen (2013) calculation based on IMF and national 
bank data (dots = country + year, e.g. HR10= Croatia in 2010) 
3.3. The FX impact analysis 
According to the methodology explained in part 2 on theory and methodology, the first stage 
of analysis is to create clusters in two steps. The first step is shown in Fig. 5, which includes 
the change of FX rate and the change of NPL ratio. The second step is incorporated into Fig. 
6, where countries with a volatile exchange rate regime are split into two more groups. 
According to Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, three groups of countries can be distinguished: (1) The group 
of rigid FX rate, which used a currency board or something similar, or adopted the euro. (2) 
The group of locally financed countries, which means that although they had volatile FX 
rates, the significant majority of the loans was financed in local currency. (3) The group of 
foreign-financed countries which means that apart from a volatile FX rate, they were financed 
in foreign (currency) loans with high FX risk. 
From Fig. 5 it is obvious, that those countries that have had pegging to euro or joined to the 
euro zone early in the eve of the crises could not have a significant impact from the euro FX 
rate. In the case of euro zone members and successful currency boards, we simplify the 
situation to no FX risk. It does not make sense to analyse the spot rate impact on credit 
default. These countries can be excluded from our FX analysis: Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia. (Only Hungary had been indebted significantly in a 
different currency (CHF), where cross rates still matter in HUF-EUR-CHF relations, but this 
country is not in the rigid rate group.)  
From Fig. 6 with the rest, we have to recognize that the countries from the group of locally 
financed ones in crediting had very narrow credit channel to accumulate the FX risk in the 
banking system through loans. The following ones belong to the locally financed group: 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia. At the same time, it has been opposite in the group of 
foreign-financed countries. The foreign-financed group includes Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, 
and Romania. (Croatian data are also indicated in Fig. 6 to show its indebtedness. But as it has 
had a peg with a narrow floating margin, Croatian data are not included into the regression 
analysis for the reasons explained about pegging.)  That is why it is reasonable to analyse the 
two groups separately. 
 
Fig. 5. Clusters by change of FX rate and of NPL ratio  
 
Source: author’s composition from ECB, Nat. Bank of Ukraine, IMF Financial Soundness 
Indicators, Raiffeisen Research, Nat. Bank of Serbia, Fed. Res. Bank of Saint Louis, (dots = 
country + year, e.g. RS10= Serbia in 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Clusters by share of FX loans and of NPL ratio  
 
Source: author’s composition from IMF FSI, Raiffeisen Research, Nat. Bank of Serbia, Fed. 
Res. Bank of Saint Louis, (dots = country + year, e.g. RS10= Serbia in 2010) 
 
The result of linear regression analysis is summarized in Fig. 7. Although results are not 
robust, difference can be measured between states of local or foreign currency financed 
economies in the regression of the NPL ratio and the FX rate volatility. We can establish that 
in the case of countries financed in foreign currency, the ratio of NPL has had stronger 
correlation with changes in FX rates. This difference appeared both in constant and beta, and 
also in the case of r2.  The r2 is small in both groups, which means that the regression curve 
does not fit the variables very well. The standard error of estimation is bigger in the case of 
foreign currency financed economies, which suggests a weaker accuracy of beta. However, 
the significance of the estimation on foreign currency financed group is 0.03 < 0.05, which 
means that the estimator is correct with an accuracy of 95 percent. At the same time, the 
significance of the estimation on the local currency financed group is 0.25, which means that 
this estimator cannot be considered acceptable. 
In summary, we can conclude that the currency of indebtedness and the national policies led 
to a portfolio of loans by currency mattered in credit default during the crisis, which thus 
determined the credit contagion, too. 
Fig. 7. Regression curve estimation separately by countries financed from local currency 
(locfin) or from foreign currency (foreignfin), 2009-2013, quarterly data 
 
 
 
source: author from data of IMF FSI, Nat.Bank of Serbia, Fed. Res. Bank of Saint Louis, 
ECB, Nat. Bank of Ukraine;  line is the linear regression, ‘°’ is sign of observations., SPSS 
estimation, NPL= non-performing loans, DFX= FXDIFi  
 
Table 1. 
Dependent 
variable r2 
standard 
error of 
estimation  
sum of 
squarres 
of 
regression 
sum of 
squarres 
of 
residuals F-test 
degree of 
freedom 
of 
residual Sig.  constant beta 
NPL_locfin  0.025 1.5213  3  123  1.347  53  0.251  5.981  -2.614  
NPL_forreignfin  0.062  5.58868  152 2311   4.871  74  0.03  10.024 11.155  
 
Source: author’s calculation with SPSS, sig. = significance 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analysed the contagion effects in the CEE region. We established the 
relevant aspects of banking contagion in the region. We excluded the information contagion 
because of its regional irrelevance. We cited the previous researches on correlation between 
macroeconomic indicators and banking contagion in CEE region. The change of GDP, the FX 
rate, the interest rate can significantly determine the credit defaults and this way the contagion 
risk. We focused on the FX rate impacts.  
We can recognize that the CEE region has had specific banking and policy circumstances 
affecting the risk of contagion. The countries in the region are not unanimous in source of risk 
and structure of crediting. Although, the region had common, similar post-Communist 
transitionary past, the more than two decades of market economy created significant policy, 
economic and social differences, which were enough to differentiate among the national 
economies. It must be taken into account that the multinational ownership has significance in 
the CEE region as a softener of contagion risk. Besides, the policy differences before the 
crisis determined the inherited stock of external or FX debt in the national level. 
We classified the CEE countries by non-performing loans, FX rate volatility and currency 
composition of loans. The countries with pegged euro rate (strict pegging or euro 
membership) were classified where the actual volatility of FX spot rate is zero, which means 
that its impact on debtors’ solvency is insignificant. We split the rest of the countries into two 
groups, one with majority of local currency loans, and another with foreign currency loans. 
The separate regression analysis of the two groups showed differences, therefore we could 
conclude that the currency of loan financing has had determining power on the accumulation 
of credit defaults during a recession period. Consequently credit contagion is measurable in 
the CEE region and it was multiplied by the FX risk. 
It has been proved that those countries which believed they could finance themselves and 
their private sector from FX loans with low risk premium with high country risk actually 
worsened their own external financial position. The difference can be observed in the 
regression analysis by clusters.   
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